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Scientific research on consciousness is critical to multiple scientific, clinical, and           
ethical issues. The growth of the field could also be beneficial to several areas              
including neurology and mental health research. To achieve this goal, we need to set              




From mystery to a maturing science 
 
The problem of consciousness – explaining how subjective experiences come about – is             
often portrayed as a deep mystery, requiring radical solutions such as the revision of              
fundamental physical laws. Despite the ongoing controversy concerning the scope of the            
problem that consciousness poses to science at a conceptual level, it has become             
increasingly clear that current empirical and theoretical work is already leading to valuable             
scientific and clinical insights. For this translational potential to be fully realized, factors             
essential for the growth of the discipline, such as funding and creation of jobs, are just as                 
important as th​e empirical findings themselves. Here we discuss these issues and call for              
the recognition of consciousness science as an indispensable area of biomedical research. 
 
What renders some cognitive or mental processes conscious, whereas others are           
not? ​Are various non-human animals conscious, and, if not, why not? Even within the same               
individual, different states of consciousness exist at different times, ​yet consensus on a             
scientific theory of this phenomenon​ has long remained elusive.  
 
Although the problem of consciousness might seem abstract, the study of           
consciousness has many practical consequences. Achieving a better understanding of          
consciousness ​is critical to multiple medical, scientific, legal, and ethical issues, such as the              
detection of consciousness in anesthetized or non-communicating patients, infants, other          
animals, and machines [1,2]; epilepsy seizure classification; the measurement of well-being           
and happiness; and the assessment of moral responsibility [3]. 
 
In the early 1990s, ​the first academic society focused on consciousness research, the             
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC), as well as multiple dedicated             
conferences and journals, were launched. Through the past couple of decades, approaches            
and methodological standards applied by consciousness researchers have rapidly risen in           
rigor and sophistication in line with other neuroscientific fields [4]. Notably, the widespread             
adoption of rigorous experimental procedures using subjective reports, once eschewed by           
behaviorists as being outside the realm of science, has paved the way for new areas of                
scientific enquiry within neuroscience. Among others, these areas include the study of            
self-consciousness, metacognition, and mind-wandering. ​Despite methodological difficulties,       
attempts to acquire data about subjective experiences have helped move theoretical debates            
on consciousness away from speculations based on personal authority towards testable           







Given this progress, exciting new potential for further growth has become possible. In             
particular, w​e believe that consciousness science can contribute to addressing a wide            
variety of clinical challenges. ​W​hereas the relevance of consciousness for various           
neurological disorders — such as the vegetative or minimally conscious states that may             
result from traumatic brain injuries — is well recognized, more work can be done to highlight                
its potential for improving our understanding of ​psychiatric illnesses. For instance,           
consciousness research is not yet recognized as one of the strategically focused areas in              
NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) (Supplementary Note 1). ​Nonetheless, subjective           
experiences are just as important as physiological symptoms ​i​n terms of treatment            
outcomes. An understanding of the mechanisms underlying such experiences may therefore           
guide us in finding the appropriate biological target for treatment and intervention.  
 
T​his issue has recently come to the fore in the case of anxiety disorders, particularly               
in debates regarding whether targeting the amygdala may be the most effective strategy for              
reducing subjective fear [6]. It has been argued that effective treatments of anxiety and              
phobia require an understanding of the conscious experiences associated with these mental            
states, beyond their behavioural consequences [6,7]. Similarly​, the focus of pain research            
has moved from understanding the mechanisms of noxious stimulation to understanding the            
mediators of subjective pain experience [8]​. Several studies have also emphasized the role             
of consciousness science in explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia, as explicit and            
implicit cognitive processing seem differentially impaired in this condition [9]. ​As such,            
translational applications of consciousness research have the potential to create a virtuous            
cycle, whereby a theoretical understanding of consciousness guides ever more successful           
clinical interventions, and clinical results, in turn, provide critical material to evaluate and             
refine empirical theories. 
 
 
Jobs, funding, and the media 
 
Despite these exciting new translational applications of consciousness science, a relative           
scarcity of academic jobs and funding opportunities presents obstacles to further           
development. In recent years, many more employment openings have arisen in similarly            
‘young’ neuroscientific disciplines, such as neuroeconomics and social neuroscience, than in           
consciousness research (Supplementary Note 2). We suspect that this may be related to the              
lack of funding opportunities: competitive institutions understandably do not want to create            
positions to be occupied by what may be perceived as unfundable science. 
 
How bad is the funding situation for consciousness science? Amid a general            
shrinkage of research budgets in many countries, one might expect funding to be scarce.              
Overall, funding for consciousness research seems relatively healthy in Europe, with multiple            
sizable grants (e.g. from the European Research Council (ERC)) on par with those             
supporting other major topics in neuroscience. Between 2007 and 2017, 0.25% of all ERC              
grants were awarded to projects focused on the study of consciousness (Supplementary            
Note 3). Even in the US, despite the traditional perception that public funding mechanisms              
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are conservative, some subfields of consciousness research have begun to gain recognition            
under public funding mechanisms –– although the proportion of grants dedicated to the             
study of consciousness by the NIH between 2007 and 2017 is only one-tenth of the               
proportion of ERC grants for projects on the same subject (Supplementary Note 4).             
Specifically, studies of ​states of consciousness of individuals, including the neurological           
mechanisms distinguishing sleep from wakefulness, or being anesthetized from being in a            
coma, have attracted multiple major grants (R01s) from the NIH in recent years             
(Supplementary Note 5)​. 
 
Nevertheless, some areas within the field may face more challenges than others. For             
example, there are many researchers who study the varying ​contents of consciousness            
within an awake individual, or the essential mechanisms distinguishing conscious from           
nonconscious processes during normal wakefulness, rather than the varying ​states of           
consciousness that occur during sleep or in medical conditions. One hurdle for these             
scientists is the common misconception that their topic of study is already covered by other               
areas of research, such as attention, memory, and perception. Yet, whereas many            
neighboring fields are relevant, empirical studies have shown that consciousness can be            
dissociated from many other cognitive processes [4,5]. Understanding the mechanisms          
underlying consciousness of specific ​contents therefore requires dedicated efforts. Finding          
public funding support for this kind of work is not impossible, but seems to have been                
relatively challenging, at least in the US (Supplementary Note 4). 
 
This is where private funding may provide crucial opportunities. Across disciplines,           
private funding is becoming increasingly relevant for high-risk, high-reward neuroscience          
projects. In addition to companies such as Neuralink and Facebook, some private            
foundations prioritize or focus solely on consciousness research (e.g., Templeton          
Foundation, Tiny Blue Dot Foundation, Mind Science Foundation, and the Azrieli Program in             
Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, hosted by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research). 
 
For the field to benefit effectively from these exciting opportunities, two specific issues             
are worthy of our attention. First, care should be taken to avoid over-emphasis on projects of                
unrealistic ambition, such as trying to unequivocally pin down a complete, universal theory of              
consciousness, beyond what can be tested empirically now or in the near future. ​Whereas              
theories of consciousness are of utmost importance for driving further empirical progress, it is              
important to distinguish empirically productive hypotheses from mysterious and untestable          
claims such as, for example, the panpsychist view that an inactive set of logic gates could be                 
conscious. Such hypotheses ​might be tempting given the intriguing nature of the problem we              
are facing. Arguably, these projects may also have intellectual merits in their own rights​, and               
we recognize that claims initially perceived as being far-fetched could possibly end up being              
plausible​. But with limited ​funding ​resources, we should be careful about priorities. ​Contrary             
to untestable speculations, evaluating theories of consciousness partly in terms of their            
translational applications could both lead to a more rigorous and empirically-grounded           




Second, if consciousness science is to benefit from private funding opportunities, it            
will need to address how peer review of proposed research can be implemented in an open                
and fair manner. An inclusive process of peer review by experts remains an essential              
method for enabling academic work of the highest standard, as opposed to an exclusive              
process of recommendations based on arbitrary personal contacts. Given the relatively small            
size of the field of consciousness research, the challenge lies in helping private funders              
identify unconflicted dedicated experts who are genuinely invested and broadly          
representative of the state of the art. 
 
These issues are relevant for many other disciplines, but they might be particularly             
important for consciousness research in part due to how it is portrayed in the popular media.                
Although media exposure of consciousness science is frequent due to high public interest,             
popular articles often focus more on the theoretically far-reaching nature of the problem than              
on factual details of current empirical research. While this exciting image has served to              
increase public interest, it may not necessarily reflect the reality that theories of             
consciousness need to be tested rigorously, and revised amid the long process of             
accumulation of empirical evidence. We need to make sure that scientific breakthroughs in             
the field are adequately communicated to other disciplines, as well as to the public. At the                
same time, myths and speculative conjectures also need to be identified as such. Without              
addressing these issues, precious scientific funding may be misdirected, and the field may             
miss a unique opportunity to become an established discipline. 
 
 
An informal survey, and optimism 
 
Many of the observations made above are in concordance with the results of an informal               
online survey, in which respondents – academics both from within and from outside             
consciousness science – were asked for their views on the current state of the field, including                
questions on funding, the job market, the rigor of consciousness science, media impact, as              
well as how different theories may be received by experts and non-experts​ ​[10]. 
 
Despite these challenges, we remain optimistic about the future. Although the views            
presented here should not be mistaken for a complete consensus within the field, it is the first                 
time that so many co-authors, including philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists,         
physicians, and computer scientists, with active research programs tackling different aspects           
of consciousness science, have come together for a common statement on the challenges             
they face as a scientific field. Although many young academics are undeterred by these              
challenges, the field could make further progress if more of them had the opportunity to make                
consciousness their primary line of research, instead of feeling compelled to switch to more              
fundable areas. As consciousness scientists, we are privileged to study one of the most              
fundamental aspects of the mind — that which makes us who we are. Going forward, we                
encourage dialogue with funding agencies – both private and public, as we recognize the              
unique and irreplaceable contributions they each bring for both the immediate and long-term             
development of the field. In doing so, we are confident that the science of consciousness will                
emerge as a driving force not only to tackle a great scientific frontier but also to develop the                  
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